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ELECTRONICALLY FILED Pulaski County Circuit Court Terri Hollingsworth, Circuit/County Clerk 2023-Aug-14 16:04:10 60CV-23-5873 C06D05 : 93 Pages IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS _________ DIVISIONVENTURES KARMA, LLC PLAINTIFFV. CASE NO. ________JO-ANN STORES, LLC, DEFENDANT EXHIBIT 1 TO COMPLAINT LEASE AGREEMENT BetweenShackleford Crossings Investors, LLC, "Landlord" and Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., "Tenant" ~ . Dated: .'Notem~ ID , 2012 EXHIBIT 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1. EXHIBITS TO LEASE ......................................................................................... 1 SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................... l SECTION 3. PREMISES ........................................................................................................... 6SECTION 4. TERM AND OPTIONS TO EXTEND ................................................................. ?SECTION 5. FIXED MINIMUM RENT ................................................................................... 8SECTION 6. PERCENTAGE RENT [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] .................................. 9SECTION 7. GROSS SALES .................................................................................................... 9SECTION 8. TAXES ................................................................................................................ 11SECTION 9. COMMON AREA COSTS ................................................................................. 13SECTION 10. CONSTRUCTION OF PREMISES ................................................................... 16SECTION 11. USE ..................................................................................................................... 18SECTION 12. COMMON AREAS ............................................................................................ 19SECTION 13. UTILITIES .......................................................................................................... 20SECTION 14. USE VIOLATION .............................................................................................. 20SECTION 15. COTENANCY .................................................................................................... 21SECTION 16. RULES AND REGULATIONS ......................................................................... 23SECTION 17. ALTERATIONS, INSTALLATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS BY TENANT ............................................................................................................. 24SECTION 18. REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE .................................................................... 24SECTION 19. INDEMNIFICATION ......................................................................................... 26SECTION 20. WAIVER OF SUBROGATION ......................................................................... 27SECTION 21. CASUALTY AND PUBLIC LIABILITY INSURANCE .................................. 28SECTION 22. SIGNS ................................................................................................................. 29SECTION 23. ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING ............................................................... 30SECTION 24. REPAIR AFTER CASUALTY .......................................................................... 30SECTION 25. CONDEMNATION ............................................................................................ 32SECTION 26. REPRESENTATIONS AND COVENANTS OF LANDLORD ....................... 33SECTION 27. TENANT'S DEFAULT ...................................................................................... 35SECTION 28. RIGHTS OF LANDLORD ................................................................................. 36SECTION 29. LANDLORD'S DEFAULT ................................................................................ 37SECTION 30. MORTGAGE SUBORDINATION .................................................................... 37#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 SECTION 31. NO WAIVER ...................................................................................................... 38SECTION 32. SURRENDER OF PREMISES .......................................................................... 39SECTION 33. SHORT FORM LEASE, COMMENCEMENT DATE AGREEMENT ........... .39SECTION 34. NOTICE .............................................................................................................. 40SECTION 35. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ........................................................................... .40SECTION 36. LIMITATION OF LANDLORD'S LIABILITY ............................................... .42SECTION 37. DELIVERY OF SITE PLAN ............................................................................ .43SECTION 38. SUBSTITUTE RENT ......................................................................................... 43SECTION 39. PRIOR AGREEMENTS ..................................................................................... 43SECTION 40. NO OPERATING COVENANT ....................................................................... .43SECTION 41. APPLICABLE LAW AND CONSTRUCTION ................................................. 44SECTION 42. UNAVOIDABLE DELAYS .............................................................................. .44SECTION 43. REASONABLE CONSENT ............................................................................... 45SECTION 44. NO PARTNERSHIP ........................................................................................... 45SECTION 45. ESTOPPEL ......................................................................................................... 45SECTION 46. QUIET ENJOYMENT........................................................................................ 45SECTION 47. HOLDING OVER .............................................................................................. 45SECTION 48. BROKERS .......................................................................................................... 46SECTION 49. CAP ON ADDITIONAL RENT ......................................................................... 46SECTION 50. DROP SITE ........................................................................................................ 46SECTION 51. CAPTIONS ......................................................................................................... 46SECTION 52. VARIATION IN PRONOUNS .......................................................................... .46SECTION 53. SECTION REFERENCES ................................................................................ .46SECTION 54. BINDING EFFECT OF AGREEMENT ........................................................... .46SECTION 55. ATTORNEY'S FEES ..........................................................................................46SECTION 56. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION .................................................................... .47SECTION 57. SHOPPING CENTER LEASE .......................................................................... .47SECTION 58. FINANCING CONTINGENCY ........................................................................ .47SECTION 59. DECLARATION AND REA ............................................................................. 47SECTION 60. SIDEWALK SALES .......................................................................................... 47SECTION 61. CONTAINER AREA; CARDBOARD STORAGE .......................................... .47SECTION 62. CART CORRALS .............................................................................................. 48#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 ii LEASE ~bu- This Lease is made as of Novernser \ D , 2012, between Shackleford CrossingsInvestors, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("Landlord"), and Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., anOhio corporation ("Tenant"). Landlord and Tenant covenant and agree as follows:SECTION 1. EXHIBITS TO LEASE (a) The following exhibits are attached to and made a part of this Lease, and areincorporated herein by reference: Exhibit A. The description of the lands upon which the Shopping Center islocated. Exhibit B. The site plan showing the location of the Premises, as hereafterdefined, the Shopping Center buildings, Casualty Zone, the Protected Area, the parking areas,driveways and common areas and containing other general information relative to thedevelopment of the Shopping Center (the "Site Plan"). Exhibit C. Landlord's Construction Obligations. Exhibit D. Tenant's Prototype Signage Plans. Exhibit E. Pylon Signs. Exhibit F. The Restricted Uses on the date of this Lease. Exhibit G. Form of Subordination, Non-Disturbance and Attornment Agreement. Exhibit H. Form ofEstoppel Certificate. Exhibit I. Rules and Regulations. Exhibit J. Liens and Exceptions.SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS The terms listed below have the respective meanings as follows: (a) Additional Rent: Tenant's Proportionate Share of Taxes (Section 8), Tenant'sProportionate share of Common Area Costs (Section 9), and Tenant's Proportionate Share ofInsurance (Section 21 ). (b) Anchor Tenant: Wal-Mart Super Center and JC Penney. (b-1) Junior Anchor Tenant: Gordman's and Babies R Us.#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 (c) Commencement Date: (1) the three hundred fifty seventh (357th) day after theDelivery Date, or (2) the day that Tenant opens for and conducts business in the Premises,whichever day first occurs. Unless Tenant otherwise opens for business, the CommencementDate will not occur during the period from November 15 to January 31 or during any period thatTenant has not received all required governmental permits and approvals necessary for Tenant'sWork, provided Tenant promptly applies for and diligently pursues obtaining such permits andapprovals. Should Tenant choose to open during the period November 15 to January 31, thenTenant shall pay Substitute Rent until the next following February 1. (d) Common Areas: the parking areas, driveways, aisles, sidewalks, malls (whetherenclosed or unenclosed), truck storage areas, and other common, service and related areas andimprovements within the Shopping Center, whether open to the public generally or for the nonexclusive use of one or more tenants, and whether or not shown on Exhibit B. (e) Declaration: that certain Declaration of Restrictions and Grant of Easem*ntsgoverning the Shopping Center, as amended. (f) Default Rate: an annual rate of interest equal to three and one half percentagepoints over the three month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), as published in the WallStreet Journal as of the date of default. (g) Delivery Date: the date that Landlord delivers the Premises to Tenant with all ofthe Delivery Requirements satisfied. (h) "Delivery Requirements" means the following: (1) Landlord's construction obligations with respect to the Premises (set forth on Exhibit C) are substantially complete; (2) the Premises is delivered to Tenant free and clear of any Hazardous Material; (3) Intentionally omitted; (4) all Common Areas in the Shopping Center (with the exception of those areas immediately surrounding the Demised Premises and as described in Exhibit C) have been substantially completed in accordance with all applicable Laws, including, without limitation, all delivery access, paving and striping of the parking areas, and landscaping; and (5) Intentionally omitted. (i) Estimated Delivery Date: Landlord's good-faith estimate of the Delivery Date isMarch 1, 2013. (j) Gross Leasable Area: the number of square feet of floor area on all levels(including any mezzanines, basem*nts or balconies that are used for retail sales), measured fromthe exterior face of exterior walls and of service corridor walls, the exterior building line for#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 2 sidewalk or mall frontage, and the center line of party walls, with no deduction for columns, stairs, elevators, or any interior construction or equipment but excluding any mezzanines, basem*nts or balconies that are not used for retail sales and excluding free-standing buildings which maintain their own parcels. All office space is to be included in the Gross Leasable Area oft'iie Shopping Center. With respect to the Shopping Center, the Gross Leasable Area is the total constructedGross Leasable Area available for the exclusive use and occupancy of tenants within theShopping Center, whether or not actually rented or open for business, as the same exists fromtime to time. With respect to the Premises, the Gross Leasable Area will be the actual completed GrossLeasable Area, as the same exists from time to time. Any change in Gross Leasable Area, whether of the Premises or Shopping Center, will bedeemed in effect on the first day of the next succeeding month following such change. Landlordcovenants to advise Tenant of any increase or decrease in the Gross Leasable Area of theShopping Center due to the construction or demolition of any buildings in the Shopping Centerwithin a commercially reasonable time following any such change, together with a current SitePlan reflecting such change. Landlord represents and warrants that to the best of Landlord's knowledge the GrossLeasable Area of the Shopping Center intended for exclusive use and occupancy as shown in theSite Plan is at least 286,636 square feet. (k:) Intentionally omitted. (1) Hazardous Materials: See Section 35. (m) HVAC: heating, ventilating and air conditioning. (n) Landlord's Work: the work to be performed by or at the direction of Landlord asset forth on Exhibit C. (o) Laws: any and all laws, codes, ordinances or regulations passed into existence byany Public Entity now or hereinafter in existence. (p) Lease Year: a period of 12 consecutive calendar months during the Term. Thefirst Lease Year (or Lease Year One) begins on the first day of February next following theCommencement Date, unless the Commencement Date is the first day of February, in whichevent the first Lease Year begins on the Commencement Date. The first Lease Year will includethe first Partial Lease Year, if any. Rent and any limitations on such Rent for purposes of anyPartial Lease Year will be proportionately adjusted based upon the actual number of days of suchPartial Lease Year in relation to the number of days in a full Lease Year. (q) Intentionally omitted.#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 3 (r) Partial Lease Year: the period, if any, of fewer than 12 consecutive calendar months between the Commencement Date and the first day of the first Lease Year and the period, if any, of less than 12 consecutive calendar months between the last day of the last Lease Year and the expiration of the Tenn. (s) Intentionally omitted. (t) Permitted Use: Subject to existing exclusive uses and covenants of record, Tenant may use the Premises for the sale of fabrics of all kinds; goods sold by the yard; patterns; knitting supplies, needlepoint, macrame; art materials and supplies; finished crafts, craftmaterials and supplies; educational aids, materials and supplies; yarns; all types of notions; floralproducts, artificial flowers and accessories; scrapbooks and scrapbooking supplies and materials; framed artwork; picture frames, framing (both readymade and custom made) and framingmaterials and supplies; fabric care items; foam products; ceramics; wearable art and wearable artsupplies; miniatures, dolls, hobby items; sewing machines, sewing machine furniture; irons,ironing boards; seasonal merchandise; custom services and custom products using arts and craftand sewing components including, but not limited to, quilting, bow-making, window treatments,floral design, fashion sewing, instructional classes, materials and services; and the incidental saleof (defined as no more than 10% of any individual following item) baskets, wicker items;housewares; linens, curtains, towels, pillows; drapery and upholstery materials; draperies,drapery hardware; blinds, shades, shutters and window treatments; do-it-yourself products andaccessories; bridal apparel and accessories, wedding supplies; gift items, cards, party supplies;paper goods, stationery; candles, candlesticks, brass and pottery; indoor and outdoor housedecorating products and accessories; furniture; prepackaged and unpackaged food and foodproducts, coffee, tea, and assorted beverages; instructional books and tapes; children's books;toys; vacuum cleaners, lamps, small household appliances; products, accessories related to all ofthe foregoing, and other items and services customarily offered for sale by a fabric, craft orgeneral merchandise store, and such other related merchandise and services typically offered in amajority of the stores operated by Tenant under the name Jo-Ann, Jo-Ann Fabrics and Crafts orsuch other name under which Tenant may operate. (u) Plans and Specifications: the final plans and specifications for the construction orremodeling of the Premises, in the form of Exhibit C, as the same may be modified by writtenagreement by and between Landlord and Tenant. (v) Premises: a portion of the Shopping Center as shown on the Site Plan and as morefully described in Section 3(a)(i) below. (w) Protected Area: the area depicted and labeled on the Site Plan. (x) Protected Use: the sale of fabrics of all kinds; fabrics sold by the yard; upholsterymaterials (except as may be sold by a seller of custom or made to order furniture); scrapbooksand scrapbooking materials and supplies; patterns, yarns and knitting supplies; needlepoint;macrame; artificial flowers and accessories; arts and crafts materials and supplies; all types ofnotions; custom framing and framed artwork (except as may be sold by an art/framing orphotography studio in the Shopping Center, not to exceed 4,000 sq. ft.); sewing machines;#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 4 sewing machine furniture; and products, accessories and services related to all of the foregoing ("Protected Use Items"). (y) Public Entity: the federal, state, county, municipal or other governmental unit, however denominated, and any agency, division, department or public official thereof, now or hereafter having jurisdiction, in any respect, over the Premises, the Shopping Center or Shopping Center. (z) REA: that certain Reciprocal Easem*nt Agreement governing the ShoppingCenter and adjacent property, to be entered into between Landlord and the owner of the adjacentparcel depicted and labeled on the Site Plan. (aa) Rent: Fixed Minimum Rent, Tenant's Proportionate Share of (i) Common AreaChanges; (ii) Taxes; and (iii) Insurance Costs, Substitute Rent and all other monetary obligationsof Tenant to Landlord under this Lease. To the extent either party is obligated to pay orreimburse the other party for any fees or charges in this Lease, including but not limited toattorney fees, such reimbursing party shall only be obligated for such fees to the extent that suchfees are reasonable. (bb) Shopping Center: the Shackleford Crossing Shopping Center located at LittleRock, Arkansas consisting of all buildings including the Premises and Common Areas, and otherimprovements located within the Shopping Center and identified on Exhibit A. Landlord shallhave the right, from time to time, in its sole discretion, to increase, reduce and/or otherwise alterthe Shopping Center, including, without limitation, the sale and/or acquisition of land, whetheror not currently subdivided, and/or the buildings comprising the Shopping Center. Additionally,notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, for the limited purpose of calculatingthe Common Area Costs, Taxes, and Insurance Costs, Landlord shall have the right, from time totime, in its sole discretion, to include or exclude parcels or areas adjacent to or within theShopping Center, which may be owned by Landlord or an entity other than Landlord, including,without limitation, Landlord's affiliates, subsidiaries, joint venture partners or parent entity;prm,ided that the calculation of Tenant's Proportionate Share of the Common Area Costs, Taxes,and Insurance Costs shall be adjusted accordingly to include or exclude, as the case may be, theGross Leasable Area of the buildings located within such parcels or areas. (cc) Intentionally omitted. (dd) Sign Drawings: the portion of the final plans and specifications for Tenant's pylonsigns and exterior sign(s) on or about the Shopping Center which are part of Exhibits D and E, asthe same may be modified by written agreement by and between Landlord and Tenant. (ee) Substantially complete: complete with the exception of minor "punchlist" itemsthat can be completed without interfering with the performance of Tenant's Work. (ff) Substitute Rent: an amount equal to 50% of the Fixed Minimum Rent in lieu ofthe Fixed Minimum Rent (but Tenant shall continue to pay all Additional Rent) required to bepaid hereunder. Tenant is not obligated to pay any Fixed Minimum Rent (but Tenant shallcontinue to pay all Additional Rent) at any time when Substitute Rent is payable pursuant to anyprovision of this Lease.#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 5 (gg) Tenant's Delay: any delay caused solely by the acts or omissions of Tenant inciuding, without limitation, Tenant's failure to perform any of Tenant obligations under this Lease to the extent such performance by Tenant is necessary in order for Landlord to perform Landlord's obligation under this Lease. (hh) Tenant's Proportionate Share: a fraction, the numerator of which is the GrossLeasable Area of the Premises and the denominator of which is the Gross Leasable Area of theShopping Center. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if any portion of Common Area Costs, Taxes,or Insurance Costs are furnished or directly payable by an individual tenant or occupant asopposed to Landlord, the cost of the item(s) furnished or payable by such tenant or occupantshall not be included in Common Area Costs, Taxes, or Insurance Costs, as the case may be, andthe square footage of the tenant or occupant furnishing or paying for such item(s) shall not beincluded in the calculation of Tenant's Proportionate Share of such item(s). Tenant'sProportionate Share shall be adjusted in the event of any increase or decrease in the GrossLeasable Area of all buildings within the Shopping Center or the ground floor area of thePremises. (ii) Tenant's Work: the work, if any, to be performed by or at the direction of Tenantin finishing the Premises as provided in the Plans and Specifications. (jj) Term: the Initial Term, as hereafter defined, and each Extended Term, as hereafterdefined, if any, and any period of holdover tenancy. (kk) Termination Date: July 1, 2013. (11) Intentionally omitted. (mm) Unavoidable Delay: A material delay beyond the reasonable control of thedelayed party caused by labor strikes, lock-outs, labor troubles, industry-wide inability toprocure materials, failure of power, extraordinary restrictive governmental laws or regulations(such as gas rationing), riots, war, military or usurped governmental power, acts of terrorism,sabotage, material fire or other material casualty, or an extraordinary and material act of God(such as a tornado or earthquake), but excluding inadequacy of insurance proceeds, litigation orother disputes, financial inability, lack of suitable financing, and delays of the delayed party'scontractor unless otherwise caused by an event of Unavoidable Delay.SECTION 3. PREMISES (a) For the Rent and upon the terms and conditions contained in this Lease, Landlorddemises, leases and lets to Tenant during the Term, and Tenant rents and hires from Landlordduri.llg the Term, the following described property: (1) The Premises, located within the Shopping Center, on the Shopping Center, consisting of space having approximately 14,000 square feet of Gross Leasable Area, with minimum frontage of 75 feet (to the center of the side walls), identified by street address to be identified prior to the Commencement Date and outlined on the Site Plan (the parties agree that if Tenant installs a mezzanine in the Premises that is not open to the#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 6 public, such space shall not be included in the Gross Leasable Area of the Premises); and (2) The right, in common with Landlord and all other tenants and occupants of the Shopping Center granted similar rights by Landlord, to the non- exclusive use of all Common Areas. At any time up to 60 days after the Commencement Date, either party has the right tomeasure the Premises. If the parties cannot agree to the measurement, then representatives ofLandlord and Tenant will jointly measure the Premises. If such representatives cannot agree,then the Premises will be measured by an architect jointly selected by Landlord and Tenant,whose fee will be paid equally by Landlord and Tenant, and the measurement of the floor area bysuch architect will bind Landlord and Tenant. If actual field measurements indicate a GrossLeasable Area smaller than set forth above in Section 3(a)(l), then Rent will be reduced on thebasis of the actual field measurements. If actual field measurements indicate a Gross LeasableArea larger than set forth above in Section 3(a)(l), then there shall be an adjustment in Rent,provided that such adjustment shall not exceed one percent (1 %) unless Tenant requested that theGross Leasable Area be increased. (b) Subject to the reasonable consent of Tenant, Landlord expressly reserves the rightto maintain, use, repair and replace the pipes, ducts, conduits, utility lines, tunneling and wiresleading through the ceiling, plenum areas, columns, partitions, and within or under the floor slabscomprising part of the Premises, but only to the extent that such installations (i) are reasonablynecessary to serve the Premises or other parts of the Shopping Center, (ii) are installed inlocations that will not unreasonably interfere with Tenant's use of the Premises or Tenant'spermitted signage, (iii) are not exposed within the selling area of the Premises, and (iv) do notdecrease the ceiling height of the Premises. In exercising the foregoing right, Landlord shall notunreasonably interfere with the use or occupancy of the Premises or commence any such workwithout first notifying Tenant, at least five (5) days in advance (except in the event of anemergency, in which event no such notice shall be required), of the commencement of suchwork.SECTION 4. TERM AND OPTIONS TO EXTEND (a) The Initial Term begins on the Commencement Date and ends on the last day ofthe tenth (10th) Lease Year, unless sooner terminated as herein provided. (b) Provided Tenant is not then in default of this Lease beyond applicable cureperiods, Landlord grants Tenant the right and option to extend this Lease for four (4) additionalperiods of five (5) years each (individually called an "Extended Term" and collectively called"Extended Terms"), commencing upon the expiration of the Initial Term or such prior ExtendedTerm, as the case may be. Each Extended Term shall be upon the same terms, covenants andconditions as the Initial Term except (i) for the option to extend then exercised, (ii) for suchchanges, if any, in Rent or other Tenant charges as are expressly set forth in this Lease, and (iii)that the Premises will be provided in their then existing condition, on an "as-is" basis at the timethe applicable extension term commences, and Tenant shall not be entitled to any construction,buildout or other allowances with respect to the Premises during the Extended Term.#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 7 (c) Tenant must deliver written notice to Landlord of its election to extend this Lease for an Extended Term on or before the date that is 180 days before the expiration of the Term. If Tenant fails to timely deliver such notice, the Lease shall expire as of the end of the then current Tenn. (d) Intentionally omitted. SECTION 5. FIXED MINIMUM RENT (a) From and after the Commencement Date, Tenant shall pay to Landlord, withoutnotice, demand or offset, except as otherwise expressly permitted in this Lease, at the addressherein specified for notices to Landlord, all Rents, including without limitation, Fixed MinimumRent for the Premises as follows: (1) During Lease Years One through Five of the Initial Term at the rate of $10.50 per square foot in equal monthly installments of $12,250.00; and (2) During Lease Years Six through Ten of the Initial Term at the rate of $11.50 per square foot in equal monthly installments of$13,416.67; and (3) During the first five-year Extended Term at the rate of $12.55 per square foot in equal monthly installments of$14,641.67; and (4) During the second five-year Extended Term at the rate of $13.68 per square foot in equal monthly installments $15,960.00; and (5) During the third five-year extended term at the rate of $14.91 per square foot in equal monthly installments of $17,395.00; and (6) During the fourth five-year extended term at the rate of $16.25 per square foot in equal monthly installments of$18,958.33. (b) Tenant must pay monthly installments of Fixed Minimum Rent in advance on orbefore the first day of each month during the Term, commencing on the first day of the firstmonth next following the Commencement Date (unless the Commencement Date is the first dayof the month, in which event the first monthly installment shall be due on the CommencementDate). Notwithstanding the foregoing, Landlord must invoice Tenant, which invoicing will notoccur before the Commencement Date, for the first monthly installment of Pixed Minimum Rent.In no event will such installment be due until ten days after Tenant's receipt of this initialinvoice. Fixed Minimum Rent for the partial month, if any, after the Commencement Date willbe computed on a per diem basis (assuming a 30-day month), and Tenant must pay the FixedMinimum Rent for such partial month concurrently with the first monthly installment. If Tenantfails to pay Rent on the due date and Landlord notifies Tenant in writing of such failure twice inany Lease Year, then if Tenant fails to pay Rent on the due date thereafter in the same LeaseYear, then the Landlord, in addition to the Rent then owed, is entitled a late fee of $100 for suchthird late payment and any such other late payment of Rent thereafter during that Lease Year.#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 8 SECTION 6. PERCENTAGE RENT [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] SECTION 7. GROSS SALES (a) "Gross Sales" means the entire amount of the actual receipts, whether cash orotherwise, from all sales of merchandise and services for all business conducted in, on or fromthe Premises, including mail or telephone orders received at the Premises and filled from thePremises or elsewhere (but excluding mail, telephone, internet or other orders not originated orfilled at the Premises and including income to Tenant from sales by any assignees, sublessees,concessionaires or licensees of Tenant located at or on the Premises). Each sale upon installmentor credit shall be treated as a sale for the full amount thereof in the month during which such saleshall be made, irrespective of the time when Tenant shall receive payment (whether full orpartial) from its customers. Layaway sales, so called, shall be included in the Gross Sales of therespective computation period only to the extent of payments received during that computationperiod. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Tenant shall (x) not be obligated to verify, (y) not beliable for the accuracy or inaccuracy of, and (z) not be placed in default and this Lease shall notbe tenninated due to any Gross Sales reported or not reported by any assignee, sublessee,concessionaire or licensee of Tenant. (b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the following are excluded from GrossSales: (1) sums collected and paid out for any sales tax or excise tax imposed by any duly constituted governmental authority; (2) the value or price of merchandise exchanged between the stores of Tenant, or the affiliates of Tenant, if any, where such exchange of merchandise is made solely for the convenient operation of the business of Tenant or the affiliate of Tenant and not for the purpose of consummating a sale which has been made at, in, from or upon the Premises, or for the purpose of depriving Landlord of the benefit of a sale which otherwise would be made at, in, from or upon the Premises; (3) the amount of returns to shippers or manufacturers; (4) sales to employees made at a discount not to exceed two percent (2%) of Gross Sales; (5) non-sufficient funds check charges or financing charges to customers whether or not separately stated or billed not to exceed two percent (2%) of Gross Sales; (6) service charges to customers who buy a budget or deferred payment plan; (7) revenue from gift certificates or gift cards until redeemed at the Premises; (8) revenue from vending machines in non-sales areas used solely for the benefit of employees;#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 9 (9) the amount of any cash or credit refund made upon any sale where the merchandise sold, or some part thereof, is thereafter returned by the purchaser and accepted by Tenant; (10) sales of fixtures; (11) all sums and credits received in settlement of claims for loss or damage to merchandise; (12) non-retail bulk sales of merchandise outside of the ordinary course of business on the Premises; (13) tax exempt sales or merchandise donated or sold at a discount to charitable or non-profit organizations; ( 14) the value attributed to merchandise taken in trade; (15) referrals to affiliates of or other divisions of Tenant; (16) fees for gift wrapping, mailing and other customer services provided on a not for profit basis; (17) sales of lottery tickets, special event tickets and the like (but the commissions paid to Tenant shall be included in Gross Sales); (18) the amount of credit sales and credit accounts incurred at the Premises which are written off as bad debts and deducted as an expense not to exceed two percent (2%) of Gross Sales; and (19) sales by any sublessee, concessionaire or licensee in the Premises, except that any payments to Tenant by such entity will be included in Gross Sales. (c) At any time within two years after the close of each Lease Year and Partial LeaseYear, but not more often than once with respect to any Lease Year and Partial Lease Year,Landlord may cause an audit to be made by any accountant designated in writing by Landlord ofall of the books of account, documents, records, returns, papers and files of Tenant relating toGro~s Sales for such Lease Year made at, in, on or from the Premises. Tenant, upon at least 10days' prior request of Landlord, shall make all such records available for such examination at theaddress specified in this Lease for notices to Tenant during regular business hours. Landlordmust hold in strict confidence any information obtained from all such records and reportsexamined by it or by its designated accountant. Tenant shall pay to Landlord the amount of anyunderpayment revealed by such audit upon 30 days notice of such underpayment. If Landlordmakes an audit for any Lease Year or Partial Lease Year, and the Gross Sales shown by Tenant'sstatement for such Lease Year or Partial Lease Year have been understated by more than 3%,then Tenant, in addition to immediately paying to Landlord the full amount of any underpaymentas determined by such audit, must pay to Landlord the reasonable cost of such audit, not to#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 10 exceed $1,000; otherwise the audit will be at Landlord's sole cost and expense. Tenant makes no representation or warranty as to the sales that it expects to make in the Premises. (d) The Gross Sales of any Lease Year or Partial Lease Year, as the case may be, and the Substitute Rent due thereon, if any, have no bearing on or connection with the Gross Sales of any other Lease Year or Partial Lease Year. SECTION 8. TAXES (a) Landlord covenants and warrants that the entire Shopping Center will be locatedon tax parcels to be identified prior to the Commencement Date (the "Tax Parcel(s)"), that theTax Parcels shall not extend beyond the perimeter of the Shopping Center and that theimprovements comprising the Shopping Center (including the Premises and Common Areas)will be the only improvements located thereon. Once or twice per Lease Year, depending onwhen tax bills are issued by the government authority, Tenant must pay to Landlord each yearduring the Term Tenant's Proportionate Share of real estate taxes ("Taxes") and assessmentsimposed or levied upon the Tax Parcel(s) comprising the Shopping Center and paid by Landlordduring each year of the Term, after reducing Taxes by: (i) the amount of any contributions forTaxes paid by any party having the right to use the Common Areas of the Shopping Center otherthan tenant, occupant and licensees, and (ii) any rollback, discount for timely or early paymentactually received by Landlord, credit or reduction that has been granted or issued by any taxingauthority or other governmental group or agency. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if thePremises, or a portion of the Shopping Center including the Premises, is separately assessed,then Tenant will pay, the Taxes for the separately assessed parcel. Taxes shall include taxes onrents assessed in lieu, or partially in lieu of real estate taxes based on such separately assessedparcel. Landlord estimates Tenant's Proportionate Share of Taxes for the first Lease Year to beapproximately $1.80 per square foot of Gross Leasable Area of the Premises. (b) Tenant will pay to Landlord in 12 'equal installments, each in advance on the firstday of each and every calendar month, an estimated sum, which sum from the time Tenant opensfor business in the Premises through the end of the first full calendar year of the Initial Term isestimated to be $1.80 per square foot per year prorated for any partial calendar year multipliedby the Gross Leasable Area of the Premises. This estimated sum is subject to annual adjustmentsby Landlord to reflect actual changes in the Taxes. (c) Within 30 days after the end of each Lease Year, Landlord must provide Tenantwith a statement assessing and prorating the Taxes, together with copies of receipted tax bills forwhich payment is sought and reasonable verification for the computation of Tenant'sProportionate Share. Tenant must pay to Landlord, within 30 days of such receipt, anydeficiency owed to Landlord. (d) If Tenant's estimated payments are in excess of Tenant's Proportionate Share inany Lease Year, then such excess will be applied to the following Lease Year unless such LeaseYear is the final Lease Year of Tenant's occupancy, in which case Landlord must refund suchoverpayment to Tenant within 30 days after the end of such Lease Year. (e) Intentionally omitted.#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 11 (t) In no event will Tenant pay for Taxes for a time period longer than the Term. Forexample, if the Term is 10 years, then notwithstanding if the Taxes are paid in advance,contemporaneously, or in arrears to the taxing authority, Tenant will reimburse Landlord forTaxes paid during the 10 years of the Term, regardless of when such Taxes are levied or the timeperiod for when such Taxes are placed on the Shopping Center or the Premises. (g) If Landlord is not contesting such Taxes, Tenant, at its own cost and expense, hasthe right to undertake by appropriate proceedings to review or contest any Taxes levied orassessed with respect to the Tax Parcel for any tax year during the Term in the event the Tenant'srepresenting at least 70% of the Gross Leasable Area of the Shopping Center agree. Landlordhas no right to pay the same during the pendency of such proceedings, except to the extentnecessary to avoid forfeiture, so long as Tenant has first provided Landlord with a bond or othersecurity, reasonably satisfactory to Landlord, in an amount equal to the Taxes so contested, plusany penalty or interest resulting from nonpayment thereof. Landlord must sign and deliver anydocuments required to enable Tenant to prosecute any such proceedings. Any refund received asa result of such proceedings shall be applied first to reimburse Tenant for its expenses ofprosecuting such proceedings, including reasonable attorney's fees, second to Tenant asproportional reimbursem*nt for Taxes paid by Tenant to Landlord for the tax year or years whichare the subject of such proceedings, and the balance shall become the property of Landlord. Ifanyone other than Tenant (including Landlord) successfully contests such Taxes, the resultingrefund, if any, after deduction of expenses for conducting such proceedings, shall be proratedand Tenant's Proportionate Share paid to Tenant. Any increase in such Taxes incurred as a resultof such proceedings for the tax year contested by Tenant shall be paid by Tenant and the Tenant'sconsenting to such contest on a pro-rata basis. (h) If any Taxes may be paid in installments, and, subject to the exclusions below,only the installments coming due during the Term will be included within Taxes. Landlord mustuse commercially reasonable efforts to minimize the Taxes assessed against the Tax Parcel. (i) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the following are excluded from Taxes: (1) The amount of Taxes attributable to any increase in the assessed value of the Tax Parcel that is directly attributable to tenant improvements and tenant space completion work performed after the date of this Lease (whether by Landlord or by any other party) that constitutes "above standard" quality tenant improvements, provided that (A) all current buildings and improvements in the Shopping Center or as otherwise shown on the Site Plan, including without limitation Tenant's initial leasehold improvements as reflected in the Plans and Specifications, shall be deemed "standard" quality tenant improvements for all purposes of this subparagraph, and (B) this subparagraph shall be applicable only if the tax assessment (or the Public Entity's backup documentation in support of the tax assessment, such as appraisal reports) identifies the basis for the applicable increase in the assessed value of the Tax Parcel as being attributable to specified tenant improvements or tenant space ·completion work;#2349 Little Rock, ARShackleford CrossingExecution Version 10/30/12 12 (2) Any portion of the Taxes in the nature of fees, charges or assessments for governmental services or improvements directly related to the initial construction or any alteration, expansion or rehabilitation of the Shopping Center or other improvement of the Tax Parcel; (3) Any impact fee, user fee, exaction fee, environmental fee or other tax paid as a prerequisite to construction of the Shopping Center, or construction of any addition or improvement thereto (other user fees being expressly included in taxes); (4) Any assessment, bond, tax, or other finance vehicle that is (A) imposed directly as a result of Landlord's initial construction of the Shopping Center, or (B) used to fund construction of additions or improvements to the Shopping Center; and (5) Any penalty, interest or other charge attributable to Landlord's late or delinquent payment of Taxes, provided Tenant has timely paid Tenant's Proportionate Share of Taxes. (j) Tenant must pay before delinquency all municipal, county and state taxesassessed during the Term against any leasehold interest and personal property of any kind,owned by or placed in, upon or about the Premises by Tenant.SECTION 9. COMMON AREA COSTS (a) In addition to payment of the Fixed Minimum Rent, Tenant must pay to LandlordTenant's Proportionate Share of Landlord's reasonable costs for the operation, maintenance, andrepair of the Common Areas ("Common Area Costs"), after reducing such Common Area Costsby (i) the amount of any contributions toward Common Area Costs paid by any party not atenant of the Shopping Center; and (ii) all fees and revenue collected or paid to Landlord forparking in, at, on, near or around the Shopping Center. Tenant must pay to Landlord in 12 equalinstallments, each in
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Request for Judicial Notice In the original Request for Judicial Notice and the Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice, Moving Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of: (1) various filings in this matter, including orders by this Court and the Court of Appeal; (2) the reporters transcript of the June 18, 2021 hearing; and (3) Norman v. Ross (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 617, which was issued on April 23, 2024. The court GRANTS judicial notice as to Items Nos. 1-2, and DENIES judicial notice as to Item No. 3. II. Legal Standard A party may move for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (b)(1).) The motion provided for in this section may only be made on one of the following grounds: . . . (B) If the moving party is a defendant, that either of the following conditions exist: (i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint. (ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999, citations omitted.) In deciding or reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, all properly pleaded material facts are deemed to be true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Fire Ins. Exch. v. Super. Ct. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) III. Discussion A. The Parties Arguments Moving Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings regarding all of Plaintiffs causes of action (except for the second cause of action). (MJOP, p. 21:1517.) Moving Defendants argue: (1) that the failure to pay Plaintiff for the use of his ideas cannot serve as the basis for his joint venture claims; (2) that Plaintiff is judicially estopped from arguing that his injuries arose after March 2015, when the loss of Oldman occurred; and (3) that Plaintiffs joint venture claims are time-barred. (MJOP, pp. 14:2122, 17:34, 20:8.) Plaintiff disagrees, arguing: (1) that the challenged claims arise, in part, from the misappropriation of Plaintiffs ideas; (2) that the judicial estoppel argument has no basis and misrepresents Plaintiffs claims; (3) that the delayed discovery rule applies here; (4) that true damages from the breach of the joint venture only arose once it became clear that Churchill would not be the first Winston Churchill movie to market; and (5) that to the extent additional facts are needed, amendment should be permitted. (Opposition, pp. 8:2, 10:1011, 12:7, 14:1617, 15:6.) In their Reply, Moving Defendants: (1) reiterate their argument that the joint venture claims are time-barred; (2) reiterate their argument that Plaintiff is precluded from arguing that his joint venture claims arose upon the films 2017 release; (3) argue that the recent case of Norman v. Ross (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 617 stands for the proposition that the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs claims if the Court accepts Plaintiffs new arguments; (4) reiterate their judicial estoppel argument; and (5) argue that delayed discovery does not apply to Plaintiffs claims. (Reply, pp. 4:2, 5:78, 6:1819, 7:14, 8:24.) B. The Discovery Rule 1. Legal Standard The statute of limitations usually commences when a cause of action accrues, and it is generally said that an action accrues on the date of injury. Alternatively, it is often stated that the statute commences upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action. These general principles have been significantly modified by the common law discovery rule, which provides that the accrual date may be delayed until the plaintiff is aware of her injury and its negligent cause. (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931, cleaned up.) A close cousin of the discovery rule is the well accepted principle of fraudulent concealment. It has long been established that the defendant's fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations, but only for that period during which the claim is undiscovered by plaintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. Like the discovery rule, the rule of fraudulent concealment is an equitable principle designed to effect substantial justice between the parties; its rationale is that the culpable defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to the extent that it hindered an otherwise diligent plaintiff in discovering his cause of action. (Bernson, supra, at p. 931, cleaned up.) While ignorance of the existence of an injury or cause of action may delay the running of the statute of limitations until the date of discovery, the general rule in California has been that ignorance of the identity of the defendant is not essential to a claim and therefore will not toll the statute. As we have observed, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her. Aggrieved parties generally need not know the exact manner in which their injuries were effected, nor the identities of all parties who may have played a role therein. (Bernson, supra, at p. 932, cleaned up.) 2. Discussion Here, the crux of the Parties current disagreement is whether most of the alleged conduct was beyond the various applicable statutes of limitations at the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 18, 2020 and his FAC on April 13, 2021. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges in the pleading: (1) that [o]n March 10, 2015, Mr. Oldman abruptly pulled out of Churchill; (2) that [d]espite repeated requests for an explanation for this sudden about-face, Mr. Oldmans representatives gave no reason to Mr. Lamb and Mr. Kaplan for the decision; (3) that [i]t was later announced that Mr. Oldman was in talks, and then engaged, to play the role of Winston Churchill in Working Titles motion picture Darkest Hour; (4) that Mr. Urbanski and Mr. English were also engaged by Working Title to perform the very same services on Darkest Hour that they would have performed for Churchill; and (5) that Darkest Hour premiered at film festivals starting in September 2017 to great critical acclaim. (FAC, ¶¶ 4243.) Contrary to Moving Defendants arguments, the statute of limitations issues here are not purely questions of law. Rather, due to possible issues with discovering the alleged misconductissues that are consistent with the allegations made in the FACthese are mixed questions of law and fact. If a trier of fact finds facts that would support a determination that the applicable statutes of limitations were tolled until September 2017, then there should be no issue with the causes of action that have four-year statutes of limitations given that the FAC was filed on April 13, 2021. As to the two-year statutes of limitations, Plaintiff submits three tolling agreements that appear to have tolled [t]he running of all periods of limitation from August 12, 2019 to August 31, 2020. (Decl. Kaplan, Exhs. 13.) Furthermore, Plaintiff accurately notes that Emergency Rule 9 tolled statutes of limitations from April 6, 2020 until October 1, 2020. (Opposition, p. 9:1621.) Given that the Complaint was filed on September 18, 2020 and Moving Defendants have not disputed that the alleged conduct in the FAC relates back to alleged conduct in the Complaint, it would similarly appear a later determination by a trier of fact that applicable statutes of limitations were tolled until September 2017 would mean there are no issues with the two-year statutes of limitations. C. The Allegations at Issues The Parties disagree about exactly what conduct is at issue in the pleadings. Because the statutes of limitations involve discovery-related questions of fact that are unrelated to this question (and obviate granting judgment on the pleadings due to the statutes of limitations), the court need not, and does not, resolve this issue at this time. D. Judicial Estoppel 1. Legal Standard Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that applies when (1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake. The application of judicial estoppel, even when all necessary elements are present, is discretionary. (Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824, 842, quoting Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 986987, also citing MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 422.) 2. Discussion For the same reason stated above in Section III.C., the court does not reach the question of whether Plaintiff is judicially estopped. IV. Conclusion The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.
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22CV02745COON v. CEDAR STREET SANTA CRUZ, LP DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND DEMURRER TO THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. The motion to strike the punitivedamages request is granted without leave to amend. The motion to strike the remainder of therequested portions of the FAC is granted, without leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND AND FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT This case involves allegations of a refusal to return a security deposit from a landlord to atenant as well as habitability issue. The original complaint was filed on 12/14/22 and a firstamended complaint (“FAC”) was filed on 5/21/24. Plaintiff alleges she is a disabled person as defined by Civil Code section 3345 and thatshe rented a home located at 517 Cedar St. #25, Santa Cruz. The security deposit was $3,170.00,which plaintiff asserts she paid to defendant, Cedar Street Santa Cruz, LP. Plaintiff moved intothe home on 2/5/19 and moved out on 10/31/22. Plaintiff asserts defendant illegally took portionsof the security deposit: • $300.00 non-refundable cleaning deposit related to the common areas of the building (pursuant to defendant’s response to special interrogatories nos. 1 and 5, attached to the FAC as Exhibit 2). • $1,285.00 for cleaning the rental (pursuant to defendant’s responses to special interrogatories nos. 1 and 5, attached to the FAC as Exhibit 2). Plaintiff contends defendant did not comply with Civil Code section 1950.5: defendantfailed to notify plaintiff about their right to initial inspection, and any deductions from thesecurity deposit is per se illegal. Plaintiff alleges that due to this violation, defendant could notlegally make the deductions, which had to be returned within 21 days of departing the rental unit. Plaintiff asserts defendant also failed to provide an itemized statement to plaintiff within21 days of plaintiff moving out; failed to provide documents supporting the itemized deductionswithin 21 days of plaintiff moving out, failed to obtain express consent from plaintiff to acceptthe itemized and supporting documents by electronic means, and failed to obtain express consentfrom plaintiff to receive the security deposit by electronic means. (FAC at ¶¶ 32-37.) Page 1 of 14 Causes of action alleged are as follows: (1) unlawful retention of security depositpursuant to Civil Code section 1950.5, (2) breach of residential lease agreement, (3) negligence,(4) conversion, (5) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, (6) declaratoryrelief pursuant to Code of Civ. Procedure section 1950.5, (7) breach of warranty of habitability(mold infestation), and (8) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4 for allowing the rental unit tofall into a state of disrepair. Plaintiff seeks damages related to the unreturned security deposit,punitive damages, general damages, attorney fees and costs, statutory damages. Attached to the FAC as Exhibit 1 is the rental agreement between plaintiff and defendantand attached as Exhibit 2, are a portion of defendant’s verified responses to certain specialinterrogatories, propounded by plaintiff’s counsel. Of note, in a verified response to specialinterrogatories numbers 1 and 5, defendant states plaintiff did not pay the deposit at issue.Instead, the deposit was paid by the Homeless Services Center. II. DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE a. Demurrer Defendant’s primary argument is that the deposit at issue was paid by the HomelessService’s Center, not by plaintiff and that after plaintiff’s tenancy was terminated, the remainderof the deposit, after deductions, was sent to the Homeless Services Center. (FAC at ¶¶ 28, 25,and 26, Ex. 2 to FAC, pgs. 3 – 4.) Defendant demurs to the first, second, fourth, and fifth causesof action on the basis that FAC incorporated exhibits which demonstrate plaintiff did not pay thesecurity deposit and therefore, she failed to state a cause of action for a violation of Civil Codesection 1950.5, failed to state a cause of action for breach of contract, failed to state a cause ofaction for conversion, and failed to state a cause of action for a violation of Business andProfessions Code section 17200. b. Motion to Strike Defendant moves to strike the following section of the FAC as follows: 1. Paragraphs 1 – 5 in their entirety, appearing on page 2, line 2, through and including page 3, line 2. These paragraphs outline general statements concerning security deposits and references to a study regarding security deposit retention by landlords. 2. Paragraphs 45 – 47 in their entirety, appearing on page 11, lines 8 – 18. These paragraphs contain general statements regarding moving, the costs associated with moving, and security deposits. 3. Paragraph 60 in its entirety, appearing on page 12, lines 25 – 27, relating to an award for exemplary/punitive damages. Page 2 of 14 4. Paragraph 83 in its entirety, appearing on page 14, lines 23 – 24 relating to punitive damages. 5. Paragraph 94 in its entirety, appearing on page 16, lines 15 -16 relating to “[punitive] damages.” 6. Paragraph 96 in its entirety, appearing on page 16, lines 19 – 20, relating to punitive damages. 7. Paragraph 108(e) in its entirety, appearing on page 18, lines 15 -2- stating that plaintiff and other tenants are entitled to restitution of all sums collected by defendant over the four years prior to the filing of this complaint from residential tenants and statutory damages for each of those tenants who had their deposits illegally deducted. 8. Paragraph 140 in its entirety, appearing on page 22, lines 1 -3, relating to punitive damages. 9. From the Prayer for Relief, paragraph F in its entirety, appearing on page 24, line 20, regarding punitive damages. 10. From the Prayer for Relief, paragraph G(vi), appearing on page 25, lines 7- 12. III. DISCUSSION a. Demurrer The basis for defendant’s demurrer is Exhibit 2 to the FAC, an excerpt from defendant’sverified responses to special interrogatories. The responses state plaintiff did not pay the securitydeposit but instead it was paid by the Homeless Services Center. The FAC, in contradiction,alleges plaintiff paid the deposit. A demurrer challenges only defects on the face of the pleadings or those matters whichare judicially noticeable. In this case, the allegations in the FAC are contradicted by the exhibitwhich is attached to the FAC. Defendant asserts the court can consider these exhibits, citingNealy v. Couty of Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594. In Nealy, the court noted that in addition tothe pleading itself, “[w]e may also look to exhibits attached to the complaint for operativefacts.[Citations.] And because the ‘allegations that we accept as true necessarily include thecontents of any exhibits attached to the complaint, … in the event of a conflict between thepleading and an exhibit, the facts contained in the exhibit take precedence over and supersedeany inconsistent or contrary allegations in the pleading.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 596-597.) “Thewell-pled allegations that we accept as true necessarily include the contents of any exhibitsattached to the complaint. Indeed, the contents of an incorporated document (in this case, theagreement) will take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary allegations setout in the pleading. In the case of such a conflict, we will look solely to the attached exhibit.”(Building Permit Consultants, Inc. v. Mazur (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1409.) Page 3 of 14 In the FAC, plaintiff alleges she paid the security deposit yet the attached exhibit,defendant’s verified responses to special interrogatories, states the deposit in question was paidby Homeless Services Center, not by plaintiff. The FAC expressly refers to the discoveryresponses (see FAC ¶¶ 25 – 27), to support her claim that deductions were taken from thedeposit. However, plaintiff completely disregards the other part of the discovery responses, thatis, that she did not pay the deposit. Plaintiff does not address this discrepancy in her opposition.As a result, the demurrers are sustained without leave to amend. b. Motion to Strike Defendant seeks an order to strike the claims relating to the prayer for punitive damages,the claim for disgorgement of fees to non-party tenants, and to strike the irrelevant languagefrom the FAC regarding general background information on security deposits in California and astudy relating to withheld security deposits. These motions are granted. The primary crux of the FAC is that defendant failed to return the security deposit andfailed to provide an itemized statement of deductions. Plaintiff also alleges the condition of therental, due to untreated mold problems, created a breach of the warranty of habitability and aviolation of Civil Code section 1942.4. First, defendant contends the first five paragraphs of the FAC that consist of statementsabout the general problem of retention of security deposits and a summary of a 2013 studyrelated to this topic are improper and should be stricken. In addition, paragraphs 45 - 47 of theFAC concern tenants in general and their expectations regarding the return of deposits and whathappens to tenants in general when deposits are not returned. Defendant asserts these paragraphsshould all be stricken as irrelevant and immaterial pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections436 and 431.10, subdivision (c). Defendant’s argument is well-taken. These paragraphs havenothing to do with the particular case brought by plaintiff and are not essential or pertinent to theclaims. This is particularly true given the exhibit attached to the FAC indicating plaintiff did notactually pay the security deposit. The motion to strike these paragraphs is granted as requested,without leave to amend. Second, defendant seeks to strike the claims for disgorgement of fees collected from non-party tenants in connection with her claim for Business and Professions Code section 17200.This motion is granted in light of the court’s ruling on the demurrer as to this cause of action,without leave to amend. Finally, defendant moves to strike refences to and requests for punitive damages. “[A]motion to strike [punitive damages] may lie where the facts alleged do not rise to the level of‘malice, fraud, or oppression’ required to support a punitive damages award.” (Weil & BrownCivil Procedure Before Trial (TRG 2023) § 7:186.) Plaintiff, in her opposition, refers to her Page 4 of 14original complaint, which contains some different causes of action than the FAC and does notattach the discovery responses. However, it is this FAC which is before the court. Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) states that “[i]n an action for the breach of anobligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that thedefendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actualdamages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” Civil Code section 3294 defines malice, oppression and fraud. Malice is “conduct whichis intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carriedon by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”Oppression is characterized as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjusthardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” Finally, fraud is defined as “anintentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendantwith the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legalrights or otherwise causing injury.” (See Civil Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1) – (3).) The cases interpreting section 3294 make it clear that in order to warrant the allowance ofpunitive damages the act complained of must not only be willful in the sense of intentional, but itmust also be accompanied by aggravating circ*mstances, amounting to malice. The malicerequired implies an act conceived in a spirit of mischief or with criminal indifference towards theobligations owed to others. There must be an intent to vex, annoy or injure. Mere spite or ill willis not sufficient; and mere negligence, even gross negligence is not sufficient to justify an awardof punitive damages. [Citations.]” (Ebaugh v. Rabkin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 891, 894.) In this case, there are insufficient facts pled to support a claim for punitive damages,particularly in light of the attached exhibit to the FAC showing plaintiff did not pay the depositwhich is the primary basis for the FAC and which is uncontested by plaintiff in her opposition.Further, defendant is a corporate entity. “Corporations are legal entities which do not have mindscapable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damageagainst a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees.” (Cruz v.Homebase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167.) While punitive damages liability can be imputedupon a corporate entity in certain circ*mstances (see Civil Code section 3294), the FAC does notcontain any allegations which could be a basis for punitive damages as to this defendant. The motion to strike punitive damages is granted. When read as a whole, the FAC doesnot set forth a theory for recovery of punitive damages. Leave to amend is not granted. Shouldplaintiff later find additional facts to support a claim for punitive damages against defendant, shecan seek leave to amend the complaint. Page 5 of 14Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.
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